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Abstract: 
 
This paper is one of the first to systematically address the question of whether 
strength of ethnic identity, political parties’ candidates campaign strategies, poverty, 
or evaluation of clientelism versus collective/public goods, determines who becomes 
persuadable voters (swing voters) in new democracies. It brings together three of the 
major research streams in comparative politics – the literatures on development, 
democracy, and political clientelism – to properly situate the swing voter as – 
potentially – the pivotal instrument of democracy and antidote to the public goods 
deficit in failed developmental states. Secondly, it contributes with a new and more 
adequate way of conceptualizing and measuring swing voters. Thirdly, it brings the 
use of count regression models to the study of swing voters and voting behavior in 
general. Finally, the paper  conducts an empirical analysis using a unique data set 
from a survey conducted ahead of Ghana’s 2008 elections. The results show that 
while constituency competitiveness, poverty, education, and access to information 
impact on swing voting much as expected, the role of politicians’ performance in 
provision of collective and public goods plays a much larger role than the existing 
literature makes us expect. 
 
 
 
 
Staffan I. Lindberg 
Department of Political Science 
University of Gothenburg 
staffan.lindberg@pol.gu.se    
 
 
 
 
Keith R. Weghorst 
Department of Political Science 
University of Florida 
keith.weghorst@ufl.edu  
 1
Can democracy as a set of procedures “cure” states and political elites in Africa that are 
persistently underperforming when it comes to public and collective goods? Part of the 
answer to that question lies in what motivates the African voter. Not just any voter though, 
but the swing voter – the group of individuals that decides the outcomes of competitive 
elections1. The limited scholarship that exists on African voters typically considers them 
unsophisticated and unidimensional. In part, this stems from the limited options given by 
political parties that often lack differentiable ideological foundations even in the continent’s 
more developed democracies.  When they do, this rarely translates into distinctive policy 
platforms, hence “specific policy issues have been virtually non-existent” (van de Walle 
2003, 304), especially in the presidential systems that dominate the continent.2  Voters in 
these emerging democracies are instead assumed to respond to campaigns that appeal to 
ethnicity, offer patronage or clientelistic goods, or some combination of both (e.g. Burnell 
2001; Nugent 2001; Posner 2005). Using survey data from Ghana (N=1,600), this paper tests 
and largely discards these prevailing assumptions. While clientelism as a campaign strategy 
induce some few voters to consider switching their political loyalty, it is largely ineffective. 
When politicians do well in the eyes of their citizens in terms of providing collective, 
developmental goods, the importance of clientelism but disappears completely. Swing voters 
in one of Africa’s new democracies – Ghana – evidently consider collective goods of primary 
importance when it comes to decide whether to switch their vote, or not. In that sense, 
elections can become instruments of democracy, rather than a clientelistic harvesting season 
also in Africa. 
                                                 
1 Mathematically, of course, all potential voters have the same probability of being the ‘decisive’ vote. 
2 Of 48 sub-Saharan African states, only five of them are currently Parliamentary: Botswana, South Africa, 
Lesotho, Mauritius, and Ethiopia. 
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Conceptualizing and Measuring the Swing Voter 
Voting behavior is one of the oldest topics in political science that has generated enormous 
amounts of scholarly attention. As the third wave of democratization extended its reach, 
inquiries about the conditions making citizens vote, and vote for a particular party or 
candidate in the newer democracies started to emerge. Yet, astonishingly little academic 
attention has been paid to the swing voter. Indeed, voters are often said to “swing” elections 
(e.g. Fedderson and Pesendorfer 1996, 410; also Leech 2003; Powell and Whitten 1993; 
Fraga and Ramirez 2001) but the literature on the individual swing voter is thin. In fact, one 
can be au fait with the entire literature within a few hours. Kelly (1983) was the first to 
systematically study what he labeled “the marginal voter”, followed by a series of studies 
published in Mayer (2007) and Mayer (ed. 2008) on American voters. Among the few other 
studies we have found that give explicit and systematic academic attention3 to the concept 
and behavior of swing voters are Nichter (2008) and  Lindberg & Morrison (2005, 2008).  
The intuitive understanding of a swing voter seems to be uncontroversial in the 
existing literature. It is an individual voter who is persuadable and hence is “up for grabs”(c.f. 
Campbell 2008, 118). In Mayer’s (2007, 359) words, a swing voter is “a voter who is not 
solidly committed to one candidate or the other as to make all efforts of persuasion futile”. 
The literature thus tends to treat the swing voter as the conceptual opposite of the “core 
                                                 
3 There are droves of journalistic accounts and comments by political expert observers on swing voters in 
specific elections. To be sure, some of the early and widely cited works paid attention to related concepts, e.g. 
Key (1966) uses the concept of “standpatters”; Eldersveld (1952) identified “independents” as those who have 
voted for candidates of different parties; Campell et al. (1954) and the early Michigan school used “party 
switchers”.  Rational choice models of voting has since Downs (1957) worked largely on the assumption of a 
uni-dimensional ideological spectrum where persuadable voters are located near or at the median. 
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voter”, or party loyalists.4 The question then is how we best identify and measure these 
swayable individuals. 
The first implication is that despite the popular folk theory that swing voters come 
from “battleground” areas, there is little evidence suggesting that constituencies that could be 
won by either party are more likely to have a greater number of voters that may themselves 
vote one way or another (c.f. Mayer 2007, 361). No assumptions should be made about the 
relationship between an individual’s inclination to switch his or her vote, and the aggregate 
closeness of the outcome in any particular electoral area.   
Yet, given the sparsely literature on swing voters – especially in comparative politics 
– suggestions of how to precise the intuitive definition and measure it, are unexpectedly 
diverse. Three approaches treat swing voters as qualitatively different in kind from core 
supporters and measure it accordingly: based on self-reported ambivalence (e.g. Ferree et al. 
2009; Gallup); based on lack of party affiliation (e.g. Eldersveld 1952; Linbeck & Weibull 
1987); or as an attribute based on past behavior (e.g. Lindberg & Morrison 2005; Shaw 
2008);. A fourth approach measures voters’ attitudes and assessment of candidates (Campbell 
2008; Mayer 2008) producing an index of probability to swing with no clear cut-off point. In 
what follows we argue that each one of these suffers from important limitations and propose 
a new measure that builds on the strong elements of each while permitting us to overcome a 
number of the problems they fail to surmount.   
 
                                                 
4 The convention in formal approaches (although not using the concepts of “swing” and “core” voters) also 
tends to operationalize persuadable voters as those who are more or less likely to be swayed by distributional 
appeals or do not vote consistently for a political group (e.g. Cox and McCubbins 1986, 376; Lindbeck and 
Weibull 1987, 279; and Stokes 2005) 
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Swing Voters as Self-Reported Undecided or Ambivalent 
A worrying trend in political science and economics scholarship is simply to not discuss 
definitions of the concept of swing voting at all. Several studies simply assume that swing 
voters are simply those who in surveys express some indifference, lack of awareness, or 
ambiguity about their preferred candidate or party for an upcoming election (Paolin 1995; 
Abramowitz 1999; Hinich 1981; Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick 1989; Collier and Vicente 
2009). For example, a recent paper in a premier academic journal makes extensive use of the 
idea yet, the author does not explain what he intends by a “swing voter,” except for a figure 
suggesting they are voters who are indifferent (Nichter 2008, 20). It is not at all clear, 
however, that indifferent voters constitutes a majority or even a significant portion of the 
voters that are persuadable.  
Another notion of swing voters come from the polling industry (Annenberg, Gallup, 
Pew) and scholarship associated with it using the responses indicating that a particular 
individual has not yet decided how to vote, as the measure of swing voters. This may seem 
intuitive but also has it problems. First, there are typically many more who are undecided 
when this question is asked well ahead of the polls compared to let’s say the day prior to the 
election (REFs). Although the kind of continuous polling required to make such empirical 
conclusions only exists for more mature democracies outside of Africa, we have no reason to 
believe this is any different on this continent. Hence, who is a swing voter largely depends on 
when it is measured using this approach – which seems to defeat the purpose of investigating 
swing voters as a group and finding generalizable descriptive and explanatory factors. 
Second, there are possibly a significant number of voters who at any point have already   
decided how to vote yet, could still potentially be convinced to switch to another candidate 
given x, y, or z. This group is also not captured by the undecided-approach. What we take 
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away is that being undecided is a relevant category of swing voters but we need other kinds 
of information as well in order to capture the full range. 
  
Swing Voters as Independents 
The literature that use partisanship to identify swing voters has two problematic sides. The 
first is equating swing voters with political independents (e.g. Stokes 2005, 319; Eldersveld 
1952; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987). While it is fairly intuitive that voters who do not identify 
a particular party would have a higher probability of going one way or the other, declaring 
oneself “independent” can also signify other things: I do not pay dues to a particular party; I 
do not see myself as a partisan per se; or I just do not want to reveal my party identification. 
In each case, that voter may nevertheless systematically over time  support one political party 
and hence not be persuadable. Scholars of American politics will find this familiar where 
“independence” for many reflects an ideological desire to be seen as distinct from party 
stalwarts (Bartels 2000; Keith et. Al 1992; Mayer 2008; Miller 1991). With the widespread 
skepticism towards political parties in Africa (van de Walle 2003), we have reasonable 
grounds to assume that this is a general problem.  
Second, the reverse association conflating partisanship with core voting seems 
mistaken as well. In fact, we rarely see political parties distributing policy promises and 
clientelistic rents exclusively or primarily to non-partisans. We rarely find that all partisans 
vote for their own party (e.g. Stokes 2005). The link between swing voters and political 
independents probably lies primarily in interpretations popularized in the media (Mayer 
2008, 10).  Thus, in either case the categories of independents and partisans are likely to miss 
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the target of indentifying swing voters with any great precision and should not be used in 
creating a measure of inclination to switch the vote.5 
 
Identifying Swing Voters on Past Behavior 
Acknowledging the difficulties with approaching swing voters as either the self-reported 
undecided or ambivalent, or as the independents, some argue that actual past behavior over a 
subset of elections is a more reliable indicator of an individual’s probability to be a swing 
voter in an upcoming election (e.g. Shaw 2008, 87). This approach has its roots in the 
Michigan school. The idea that the electorate is made up of “standpatters” (core voters), “new 
voters”, and  “party switchers” (swing voters) was a key notion of Key’s (1966) seminal 
work. Shaw (2008, 88) uses two panel studies from the American National Election Studies 
to classify “party voters” (core voters) as anyone who voted for the same party over three 
consecutive elections and everyone else is considered a swing voter. With reliable data on 
only two consecutive elections in Ghana, Lindberg & Morrison (2005, 9) use the same 
procedure.  
This approach has several advantages. It is conceptually unambiguous and empirically 
straightforward. It is also fairly intuitive that a past record of voting for different parties is a 
fairly determinate indicator of exactly what the concept of swing voter entails. It is also not 
unreasonable to argue that a record of voting for one and the same party over a series of 
elections should be indicative with a fairly high probability that an individual is less likely to 
                                                 
5 A related approach is Ferre et al.’s (2009) study of “swing voters” in Ghana’s 2008 election coding all voters 
who did not cast their vote for one of the two main parties as persuadable voters. This seems questionable since 
studies of Ghanaian voters demonstrate both that there are significant numbers of core supporters of the smaller 
parties’ supporters and that substantial portions of the individuals who in a particular election vote for either of 
the two big parties also are persuadable and have indeed switched parties in the past (Lindberg & Morrison’s 
(2005, 2008; Fridy 2007). 
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vote for another party in an upcoming election. The data is admittedly based on self-reported 
behavior from surveys just like many of the measures discussed above and it seems fairly 
certain that misreporting of past voting behavior could be a significant problem. Yet, asking 
about past vote choice is probably less likely to “prime” responses, compared to the 
approaches discussed above.  
Yet, a weakness of any such measure is that it necessarily excludes new and young 
voters. With a measure based on three electoral cycles this means excluding the last 12-15 
years of cohorts entering the electoral market – a significant cost and a selection that 
introduces bias if younger voters (as existing research gives us reason to believe) are both 
more educated and have less entrenched political views. Second and at least equally 
important, it is quite plausible that n voters that at any given time has voted for x  party in the 
last three elections nevertheless were “up for grabs” in all three and could have gone either 
way. This measure inevitably excludes this important group from the swing voter category.6 
Still this measure certainly represents a step forward from the partisan-independent 
distinction in capturing the swing voter and an important supplement to self-reported data on 
ambivalence in the upcoming election. Past voting behavior is a meaningful indicator of 
evident inclination to be a swing voter for many, but not all voters. It should be included in a 
measure of “swingness” but not in isolation. 
 
The Fourth Approach: Attitudinal Criteria 
A final strategy in the literature measures the attitudes and feelings voters hold towards a 
particular party or candidate (e.g. Kelley 1983; Mayer 2008).  This measure is attractive 
because it makes sense to expect individuals who express a number of things they “like” 
about a particular  party/candidate to indicate their willingness to support them in an election. 
                                                 
6 One could also object that in terms of causality it is mis-ordered with data on the dependent variable dated 
long before independent variables are measured. 
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Yet, it is not unambiguous. When making a decision at the polls, most individuals must 
balance several likes and dislikes of various candidates and parties. In American politics, the 
approach has been to create thermometer scale based on ranking of “how much” a voter likes 
the Democrat’s and the Republican’s candidates respectively creating a   -100 to +100 scale 
(Mayer 2008).7  
One advantage of this general approach is that an index contains more information 
than the binominal measures above, that is also less sensitive to small measurement errors 
affecting large number of cases if they are clustered around the cut-off point. Second, it 
captures the state of the voter in the present which is desirable. Core supporters are likely to 
show up on either end of the scale as less persuadable voters. Yet, voters with a swing voting 
record but who have firmly made up their mind for the present upcoming election and thus 
are not persuadable, would likewise be correctly classified.  
The method’s applicability is weakened by its assumption of  a two-party system8. 
The method is also susceptible to wide swings in liking and disliking influenced by media 
reporting and idiosyncratic events that may not in fact be very important for voters’ decision 
on polling day. Finally, the approach has a core weakness that is particularly damaging in 
emerging democracies. The general questions of  “likes and dislikes” of party’s candidates 
creating a single-dimensional “thermometer” assumes a unidimensional political space, 
typically on a left-right wing scale. Aside from the question of whether that scale is relevant 
in many emerging democracies, it precludes incorporating the role of non-programmatic, 
clientelistic goods and services used to get votes. Even if a voter may “like” a candidate x 
more than candidate y and if the vote was only about public policy would vote for candidate 
x, candidate y and his/her party may be able to offer clientelistic goods with immediate 
                                                 
7  
8 While not a concern for our specific analysis since our data comes from a country with two dominant parties, 
we are striving to provide a new measure that can be used widely across contexts. 
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gratification changing the equation. Theories of political clientelism suggest that certain 
categories of voters are instrumental clients who consider going with another party’s 
candidate if offered clientelistic goods. In emerging democracies, such are likely to be 
important considerations for many poor voters. Standard theories of voting behavior suggest 
that politically sophisticated and more educated swing voters evaluate provision of collective 
goods and policies. Hence, while a measure of  “predisposition to swing” should ultimately 
include indicators of both past behavior as well as present attitudes, the latter must capture 
clientelistic goods and services as well as general programmatic evaluation. 
 
A New Way to Measure the Swing Voter 
We propose a measure of the predisposition of a voter to be persuaded by political candidates 
that incorporates both attitudinal and behavioral factors. By incorporating behavioral factors, 
we focus on directly measurable attributes that give us concrete evidence of “voting one way 
or the other.”  By including positive identification by respondents of willingness to change 
votes for specific reasons along several issue-dimensions, we overcome the limitations of 
both the behavioral measure and of the single-dimensional thermometer attitudinal measure. 
Thus, we first follow the literature in American politics and consider swing voters as 
individuals who have a past record and / or express willingness to change their vote along 
any dimension.  Second, drawing insight from the literature surrounding the African voter, 
we argue that voters whose ballots may be courted by collective goods provision are 
qualitatively different from those who can be won over by clientelistic appeals. We employ a 
series of questions from the survey but make sure to distinguish between collective goods and 
clientelism in order to enable a more sophisticated analysis. It is a count-measure where an 
individual’s predisposition to switch he/her vote is operationalized as answering “yes” to x 
number of questions. 
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Components of A New Swing Voter Measure  
To construct our measure of a swing voter labeled tsv  (for “total swing vote”), we treat each 
instance of self-reported willingness to swing one’s vote, or having done so in the past, as 
one count increasing the predisposition of being persuaded to switch. We also needed to 
construct two sub-categories of this measure of “swingness” to capture the distinction 
between swing voting based on collective goods and policies on the one hand, and 
clientelistic offers on the other hand. Our measure psv (for “policy swing vote”) captures 
predisposition to swing on public goods and policy and a our measure csv (for “clientelistic  
swing vote”) captures a predisposition to swing on clientelistic grounds.9 We use the same 
questions from the survey that are used for the tsv-measure but include only the answers that 
tap into clientelism or collective goods provision in each measure respectively. The following 
items from the survey were used in constructing the count of predisposition to swing10: 
(1) An individual who voted “split tickets” (voting for different parties in concurrent 
presidential and legislative elections) received one count on tsv. 
                                                 
9 These measures share mutually exclusive components insofar as they are derived from the same questions.  If, 
for example, a voter indicates willingness to vote split-ticket gives only one response that he or she would for 
``small chops," this willingness to swing on clientelistic dimensions also indicates unwillingness to swing on 
policy dimensions.  However, other questions ask independently about particular clientelistic or policy 
behaviors, are not simply, mirror images. 
10 While the listed dimensions capture the essence of the measure, the actual number of items on the survey 
questionnaire used to construct the measures is more than six. For the tsv measure a total of 25 criteria were 
used, but some of these questions were mutually exclusive: on an open-ended question where an individual 
indicates they would swing vote for clientelistic reasons, they could not indicate swing voting with the policy 
reason. So it is more adequate to say that sixteen different items were considered. For the csv measure a total of 
13 items and for the policy scale a total of 12 items were considered.  Consequently, the theoretical range of 
these count variables was [0,16], [0,13], and [0,12], respectively. The actual maximum values for each of the 
variables is lower than the theoretical maximum either because no individuals would swing vote for all items or 
because we treated not answering questions as 0's for individuals that did not answer all of the questions. 
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(2) Additional counts on tsv were recorded for split ticket voting reasons on the justification 
that the more reasons that can sway a voter, the higher predisposition to swing. These 
reasons were also used to record counts on the psv and csv  measures respectively, 
depending on the nature of the reasons. 
(3) An individual who voted for different political parties across elections received one 
count towards tsv.  
(4) Additional counts were recorded on tsv for individuals who stated one or more reasons 
for party switching  on the justification that the more reasons that can sway a voter, the 
higher predisposition to swing. These reasons were also used to record counts on psvand 
csv. 
(5) An individual who identified as undecided when asked about vote intention for the 
upcoming elections, received one count on tsv. 
(6) Respondents who positively identified specific items that would make him/her switch 
party/candidate were given counts for these towards the stv.. In the survey, respondents 
were asked about five such hypotheticals: if the candidate offered a job, gave the 
respondent a small monetary gift, brought a development project to the community, 
brought the problems of the constituency to national attention in media or in Parliament 
and if the candidate was vigilant in oversight of the executive11. For each positive 
                                                 
11 This question was worded as: “You said you would probably vote for ….’s parliamentary candidate if the 
election is held today.  Consider if another candidate from another party did one of the following, and tell me if 
that could possibly make you switch to that candidate: (a) Offered a job to someone in your family, (b) gave you 
some ‘small chop’ say 5 to 10 Ghana Cedis or some in-kind, (c) brought a community development project 
here, (d) Brought the constituency’s problems and needs to attention on the national political arena through 
press and speeches in parliament, and (e) provided vigilant oversight over the executive, the president and 
ministers on how the national budget is spent.   
11 This was done in order to get comparable indicators of propensity to swing given that a significant number of 
respondents could not or would not answer one or more of the questions. At the same time, we wanted to avoid 
the potential biases that could be introduced by excluding any respondent who did not, or could not, answer one 
or more of these questions. If a subject has a missing value for one of these inputs, because, for example, they 
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identification by a respondent that such a circumstance could lead to him or her switch 
party, we assigned one count on tsv. Clientelistic offerings (job, monetary gifts) and 
collective goods ones (development projects, law-making, executive oversight) were 
allocated to the psv and csv measures in the separate construction of these. 
We argue that this way of measuring swing voting is superior to any that have been 
previously employed, as it indicates the central tendency of a voter to change their voter in 
the aggregate, as well as policy dimensions, in a way which cannot be hijacked by singleton’s 
in an individual’s  inclination to change the vote.  
 
The Significance of the Swing Voter for Development and Democracy 
The focus on swing voters brings together three major strands of literature in comparative 
politics. The first major cluster of research has sought to explain why some countries have 
been particularly incapable of providing public and collective goods like economic 
development, health and education, functioning regulatory systems and markets, and rule of 
law for their citizens. Various diagnosis have been offered for the deficit of public and 
collective goods provision, usually found to be particularly acute in African states. This 
literature is much too vast to give but a few examples here but these can nevertheless be 
taken as basis for the following argument. Bates (1981) demonstrated that the dependence of 
rulers on a small urban elite lead to policies undermining economic growth and the 
development of human capital. Agreeing with Bates on the outcome, scholars like Hyden 
(1980, 2006) and Chabal (1982) drawing on cultural explanations showed that even when 
good policies were in place, leaders in Africa consistently undermined these in order to 
                                                                                                                                                       
could not vote in the 2004 elections, it is not counted against them.  Thus, the total on the additive scale is 
weighted by the number of the inputs for which each respondent has non-missing values, excepting item non-
response; responses such as ``don't know" are treated as offering no support for the swingness criteria.  While 
this decision is admittedly imperfect, it estimates swingness conservatively, which we find to be more 
intellectual satisfying because it biases our measure towards lower levels of swingness 
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produce anything but private goods. Non-cultural, but otherwise similar explanations 
assigned various labels such as “clientelism” (Lemarchand 1972), “neopatrimonialism” 
(Medard 1982), “prebendalism” (Joseph 1987) and “politics of the belly” (Bayart 1993) as 
the cause of the non-developmental character of African states, in the extreme leading to 
warlordism when patronage failed to secure rulers’ power (Reno 1995).  
Recent accounts take us back in the causal chain. Herbst (2000) claimed that indirect 
strategies of rule through patron-client networks were rational in a context defined by sparse 
populations dispersed over vast territories whereas Boone (2003) demonstrated varying 
degrees of indirect and direct rule within countries using a similar model of explanation. Leys 
(1975), Mamdani (1996,) and Young (1994) demonstrated the continuing impact of 
colonialism on state-society relationships leading to the same observed outcome in terms of 
detrimental behavior by elites and rulers. Englebert’s (2000) related argument was that the 
root cause is the widespread popular perception in Africa of the state as an illegitimate 
creation, requiring politicians to entice the populace to acquiesce. Since the state in Africa is 
associated with colonial rule and abuse of power, trust-based options such as programmatic 
policy are not viable and politicians turn to political clientelism. Englebert was building on 
Jackson (1990) famous observation that the international norms of judicial sovereignty did 
away with rulers’ need for actual territorial control. Van de Walle (2001) agreed that 
international permissiveness contributed to the “permanent crisis” of development but added 
that donor aid also actively upheld developmentally dysfunctional regimes.  
It is not our ambition to adjudicate between the different causal models put forth in 
these and related works. There seems to be no lack of evidence however, that among less 
developed nations African states have been particularly incapable of producing public and 
collective goods enabling development. African states’ incapacity in this regard has recently 
been further evidenced (again with varying causal explanations) by the comparative work by 
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scholars such a Acemoglu et al. (2002), Barro (1998), Collier (2007), Evans (1995), and 
Krieckhaus (2007). The outcome is nevertheless invariant and that is what concerns us here. 
The question is if swing voters’ behavior in elections can make a difference to this malaise?  
 
Democracy as the Solution? 
A second strand of literature suggests a possible solution to this public and collective goods’ 
deficit. Democratization is the process of establishing an institutional framework of rights 
and procedures that should make rulers responsive to citizens in order to gain and hold on to 
power (e.g. Dahl 1971:8, 1989:316-7; Bollen and Jackman 1989:612-8; Coppedge and 
Reinicke 1990; Diamond 1996:53; Lindberg 2009:11-13).12 The thesis that representative 
democracy can address public and collective goods’ deficits hinges on the role of elections as 
“instruments of democracy” (Powell 2000; c.f. Lijphart 1994)13. Through elections citizens 
can select leaders and then hold them accountable for the implementation of policies that 
benefit the broader populace. Making a political system more democratic thus should expand 
                                                 
12 It is a well-known fact that many so called transitions during the third wave of democratization led (so far, at 
least) to many less than democratic, hybrid regimes. But this does not negate the fundamental changes 
introduced with processes making it more possible to hold rulers accountable. The literature is rich on the theme 
of diminished subtypes. Collier and Levitsky (1995) reportedly stopped counting at 550 different when 
reviewing the literature in the 1990s. Examples range from “limited democracy” (Archer 1995, 166), to 
“restricted democracy” (Waisman 1989, 69), “protected democracy” (Loveman 1994), and “tutelary 
democracy” (Przeworski 1986, 60-61). Some labels are perhaps misleading since they are negations of 
democracy, for example Joseph’s (1997, 367-8) “virtual democracy”. Collier and Levitsky (1997) like Schedler 
(1998) place diminished subtypes on the classical conception classification scheme based on a dichotomous 
approach and organize them on the ladder of generality and Diamond’s (2002) provides a comprehensive 
classificatory scheme. 
13 The right to self-government, as Dahl reminds us, is neither a trivial nor merely a procedural right (Dahl 1989, 
Ch.12). The procedures of liberal representative democracy are creating freedoms while distributing power 
equally in the sense of “one man, one vote”. This is what Locke referred to as all men are, or ought to, be 
considered equal as political beings13 (Locke 1689-90/1970, 322) and what Dahl calls the “idea of intrinsic 
equality” (1989, 85). Repetitive, relatively free and fair multiparty elections is the most important institution in 
actualizing this right to self-government making a particular kind of vertical accountability taking on paramount 
significance (Schedler 1999). 
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the scope of citizens’ possibilities of ensuring that rulers act in ways that guarantees the 
provision of more collective and public goods. 
So while the literature on development in Africa in part accredits the persistent 
failures to a lack of popular control of ruling elites, the literature on democratic theory 
suggests that elections could cure such ill-governed political systems. Yet, even among 
established democracies, the reach of electoral processes tends to be limited with regards to 
directing politicians in terms of policy. At the same time, the large expansion of public and 
collective goods provision in terms of the modern welfare state emerged in the decades 
following democratization in the established democracies. To what extent are electoral 
processes in emerging democracies tools for making politicians become more oriented 
towards public goods and service provision? 
 
Political Clientelism Undermining Democracy’s Effect? 
The third strand of literature we draw on suggests at least two reasons why elections in new 
democracies would not have such beneficial effects. Political clientelism and patronage can 
be used to subvert the logic of democratic accountability, for example by political machines 
capable of effective monitoring of voters choice (e.g. Cox & McCubbins 1993; Stokes 2005). 
Keefer & Vlaicu (1997) posit that political clientelism is a strategy for politicians to gain 
repute, when it is lacking otherwise. This logic is equivalent to accounts of how political 
parties provide private goods and policy favors primarily to groups who are receptive to 
material incentives (e.g. Lindbeck & Weibull 1987; Persson & Tabellini 2000). Most new 
democracies in Latin America, Africa, and Asia are presidential systems that create politics 
of “winner takes all,” where the party in power controls state institutions and the spoils (Linz 
1990).  In less developed countries this translates into monopoly of a state that typically 
controls the vast majority of economic activity as well as the networks within which such 
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public resources can be “privatized” and channeled in exchange for political support.14 
Control over office has been shown to permit the distribution of development funds (Miguel 
2004), educational support (Miguel and Guggerty 2002), and other forms of financial 
enrichment (Barkan 1979, van de Walle 2001, Wantchekon 2003). 
A number of scholars attribute this to poverty (e.g. Dixit & Londregan 1996). For the 
poor, immediate improvements of precarious material conditions, even a small cash handout 
or a bag of rice, take priority over long-term policy changes that creates credible commitment 
problems, especially in contexts where politicians enjoy little trust to begin with. Future 
improvements are subject to a high level of uncertainty – quite beside the significant 
problems of monitoring and enforcement from the point of view of a poor citizen. In this 
context, clientelistic distribution is a more viable strategy for politicians and the cost of 
buying political loyalty from a poor person is also lower than beguiling the rich (cf. Stokes 
2005). The price, however, should vary with the size of the electorate: the larger number of 
voters, the smaller the marginal value of each vote. Among others, Kitschelt & Wilkinson 
(2007) suggest that in addition to level of development, the level of political competitiveness 
therefore impacts the cost and benefits of clientelistic strategies. The value of the marginal 
voter, hence the acceptable price of a quid pro quo, is much higher in competitive districts 
than in safe havens and we should therefore expect more clientelism (understood as provision 
of private goods to individuals) in highly competitive settings. Yet, candidates can also use 
clientelistic goods to drive up turnout (mobilization rather than persuasion) much along the 
lines suggested by Nichter (2008) and Dunning & Stokes (2008), or do both as evidenced by 
                                                 
14 The canon of African politics has it that the vast majority of voters here are predisposed towards material 
distributions. For example, it has been shown that Members of Parliament in Ghana spend a tremendous amount 
of time in their constituencies providing personal assistance to voters, by paying educational expenses, attending 
funerals, distributing jobs and other benefits, as well as direct financial transfers in the form of “small chops” 
(Lindberg 2003, 2010). In this sense, politics can degenerate into pitching support for parties that best fill a 
voter's “belly” (Bayart 1993). 
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Magaloni et al. (2007). Nonetheless, there are evidently several possible ways in which 
clinetelism can undermine the logic of democratic accountability that should otherwise lead 
to provision of more collective goods. 
 
Hypotheses and Indicators 
Voting in repetitive multiparty elections is the means of vertical accountability whereby 
rulers can be made responsive to the needs and interests of the people. In less developed 
countries with a pervasive neglect of public goods and services, elections could be thus be 
expected to be instruments of collective goods provision. Not all voters are equally important 
in this regard, however. While political equality is enshrined in the principle of one man – 
one vote, the outcome of an election can in theory be determined by a single voter. This is 
particularly true for legislative elections in majoritarian systems dominating the African 
landscape where turnovers have been rampant. 15 The pivotal fraction of persuadable voters is 
what we understand to be swing voters.  
There is a saying in Africa that in safe havens, the incumbent political party could 
“put a goat” on the ticket and still win the legislative seat. In such situations, voters do not 
influence policy or the behavior of rulers through elections. We recognize that this does not 
preclude the possibility that leaders are still held accountable and being responsive through 
for example intra-party mechanisms. From the perspective of the voter, however, being a 
swing voter in such a constituency gives zero bargaining power and possibly excludes you 
from the influence of policy that one can gain from being within the ruling party. Because 
clientelism in such areas is typically used to mobilize core supporters to actually vote (so as 
to increase turnout) rather than persuade swing voters, the swing voter is also excluded from 
the distribution of clientelistic goods. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
                                                 
15 Many legislatures in Africa’s emerging democracies experiences a turnover rate of 50% or more at regular 
elections (Barkan  ed. 2009). 
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H1 An individual located in a safe haven constituency is less likely to be a swing 
voter than the same individual located in a competitive constituency 
We measure constituency competitiveness with a dummy variable where safe havens are 
coded as “1” when one party has won the last several elections with a margin of victory 
exceeding 20 percent. Other constituencies are coded as “0”16.  
To some extent safe havens overlaps in places like Africa with geographically 
concentrated ethnic groups affiliated with particular political parties and tribal identities can 
also be a mechanism for mobilizing political support (Barkan 1979; Fridy 2007; McLaughlin 
2007; Posner 2007; c.f. Lipset 1961).  Voters seems to both receive “psychic benefits” for 
supporting candidates like themselves (Chandra 2004) and in lieu of clearly defined policy 
aims, use ethnicity as a cognitive shortcuts to estimate similar electoral preferences (Ferree 
2006, c.f. Lijphart 1999, Synder 2000). While ethnicity captures a multi-faceted identity 
defined a shared myth of common ancestry, encompassing clan, language, religion, region, 
and even nation. (Chandra 2004, Chazan 1983, Fearon and Laitin 2000, Horowitz 1985, 
Young 1976), it has been demonstrated that their make-up and political relevance can change 
over time (Posner 2005). At any one point, individuals hence can be expected to be more or 
less “ethnics” in their perceived identity. This leads us to expect ethnicity to be associated 
with core voters if an ethnic identity have a clear contemporary affiliation with a particular 
political party: 
H2 If an individual self-identify with a tribe affiliated with a particular political 
party, this lowers the likelihood that individual is a swing voter 
In the case of Ghana, this means that members of the two primary politicized groups in 
Ghana — the Ewe and the Ashanti17 — should be expected to be core supporters of a 
                                                 
16 The country in which the survey data was collected – Ghana – use the first-past-the-post plurality rule in 
single-member constituencies and has two dominant parties that regularly captures 96% or more of the total 
vote. 
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particular political party. We employ two dummy variables derived from a question that asks 
respondents to identify their tribal belonging with “1” in both cases indicating being Ashanti 
or Ewe respectively.18 
In competitive elections a candidate must convince voters who can go either way and 
should therefore be more responsive to the interests and needs of the swing voter than a core 
voter. Hence, it is the swing voter that potentially is the primary “instrument of democracy” 
as well as development. Yet, this only happen if swing voters do not demand private goods to 
be distributed in exchange for their votes, and politicians do not successfully use clientelistic 
vote-buying as a main political strategy. Political clientelism undermines vertical 
accountability and consequently relieves the pressure of the politician (once elected) to be 
responsive to the collective goods and service needs of the swing voters. Hence, we expect 
that if candidates use clientelism as a major vote-winning strategy then more people will be 
exposed to it and hence potentially influenced by distribution of private goods.19 Focusing on 
the incumbent we test the hypothesis that: 
                                                                                                                                                       
17 The Ashanti make up the majority and also the cultural core of the ethno-linguistic group called Akans. Most 
other Akan tribes typically associate closely to the Ashanti. In our sample, that includes the Akyems. Another 
Akan-tribe is also in our sample – the Fanti – but they are more of an exception among the Akans since their 
affiliation with the Ashanti is much weaker and to some extent historically antagonistic. Hence, to avoid 
misunderstanding, we refer to Ashanti and Akyems as ‘Ashanti” rather than “Akan”, and keep Fanti separate in 
the analysis. 
18 As a robustness check we also constructed an index variable measuring how strongly individuals from these 
two ethnic groups identified with their tribe rather than with being Ghanaian. We used an ordinal variable 
ranging from 0 (“Only Ghanaian”) to 4 (Only Ethnic) and tribal origin was then interacted with this 
identification question to distinguish individuals who not only belong to one of the politically relevant ethnic 
groups but also identify strongly with it. The results reported below were not substantially altered by using this 
indicator so in the interest of keeping the analysis as straightforward as possible, we used to more intuitive 
measure. 
19 One can also expect clientelistic vote buying to become more normalized and accepted in such circumstances. 
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H3 The more an incumbent uses distribution of clientelistic goods an electoral 
strategy, the higher the likelihood that an individual will be a swing voter 
receptive to inducements of private goods nature. 
We operationalize this variable (‘Clientelism Supply’) as the weighted average of 
exposure to small gifts, handouts, and similar things that in Ghana are referred to as “small 
chops”. The survey asked a series of five questions regarding the respondent’s observations 
of this form of clientelism during both the previous elections campaign in 2004 and the 
current 2008 pre-election period, as well as comparisons between the two. The index measure 
ranges from 0 (no exposure) to 1 (highest level of exposure). We expect this indicator to be 
negatively associated with the total swing, and clientelistic swing measures, but positively 
associated with the measure of policy-based swing voting. 
Core voters vote for the same party more or less regardless of what they and their 
candidates do, whereas swing voters can potentially be persuaded by something, to change 
their vote. In general, we would expect swing voters to be more evaluative. Use of 
clientelism as electoral strategy could be demand-driven but Lindberg’s (2009, 2010) work 
on Ghana suggests that incumbent MPs can change the context they operate in. By engaging 
in more forceful provision of collective goods (e.g. constituency service providing non-
excludable goods for communities such as toilets, roads, markets, and competitive 
scholarship schemes), as well as engaging in more public education regarding the “proper” 
role of elected representatives, MPs can reduce the pressures for clientelistic goods provision. 
Thus, we come to formulate two hypotheses: 
H4 The ‘better’ the incumbent has performed in the eyes of an individual in terms 
of clientelistic goods provision, the smaller the susceptibility of that individual 
to be persuadable and to swing on the basis of clientelistic offers. 
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The variable ‘Patron Assistance’ variable is based on a response assessing the performance 
of an MP in providing clientelistic benefits to constituents. It has five values ranging from 0 
(strongly negative evaluation)  to 4 (strongly positive evaluative views). We expect positive 
evaluations of the incumbent MPs performance as patron to be negatively associated with the 
total swing, and clientelistic swing measures, but positively associated with the measure of 
policy-based swing voting. 
H5 The ‘better’ the incumbent has performed in the eyes of an individual in terms 
of collective/public goods provision, the smaller the susceptibility of that 
individual to be persuadable and to swing on the basis of collective goods 
offers. 
We have three variables capturing different types of collective goods. All three are 
ordinal variables scaled from 0 (very negative evaluation) to 4 (strongly positive evaluative 
views). The variable ‘Constituency Service’ measures delivery of collective development 
goods to the respondent’s community. We expect this indicator to be negatively associated 
with all kinds of swing voting. The indicator ‘Law-Making’ measures the respondent’s 
evaluation of the incumbent MPs’ performance in terms of law-making. Based on much of 
the Africanist literature, we could expect this indicator to be irrelevant for voting behavior. 
Yet, if voters in new democracies, also in Africa, are sophisticated voters, we can expect this 
indicator to be negatively associated with measures of total and policy-based swing voting 
but not relevant or even positive for clientelistic swing voting. ‘Executive Oversight’ 
measures the respondent’s evaluation of the incumbent MPs’ performance in terms of 
executive oversight. Again, we could expect to find this to be irrelevant, but if voters are 
more ‘mature democrats’ than much of the literature assumes, we can expect this indicator to 
be negatively associated with measures of total and policy-based swing voting but not 
relevant or even positive for clientelistic swing voting. 
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Finally, the literature gives us reason to hypothesize regarding the “demand-side” that 
clientelistic swing voters are poorer than other voters and that this structural disposition is 
what makes them more likely to swing based on clientelistic goods provision: 
H6 The poorer an individual, the more likely that individual is be willing to 
change her/his vote in exchange for clientelistic goods. 
It is virtually impossible (we have tried in earlier surveys) to get reliable responses on 
individuals’ income in African countries. We therefore adopted a measure used in the 
Afrobarometer asking respondents to evaluate their personal economic situation relative to 
other Ghanaians. While this measure can not approximate income, it provides at least some 
relatively reliable information of whether a respondent is much poorer or richer than average. 
In what follows, we subject these hypotheses to several tests using survey data of 1,600 
individuals in one of the new democracies in Africa (Ghana).  
 
Control Variables 
We include a set of control variables in all equations. While a potentially long list of suspects 
could be included, we restrict our sample to the most conspicuous ones. Economic Voting: 
Ours is not an analysis of economic voting per see but since this is one of the perennial 
findings in studies of voting behavior, we include it as a control variable. We use a survey 
question asking respondents to indicate how they evaluate the state of their own economic 
situation compared to one year ago. It is an ordinal variable ranging from much worse (0) to 
much better (4) and we expect it to be negatively associated with swing voting in general. 
Education: To capture the formal education of a subject, we consider the subjects’ highest 
level of schooling. This ordinal variable with five levels ranges from no formal schooling (0) 
to post-tertiary/university education (4). Clientelistic swing voting should be negatively 
associated with level of education while policy-swing voting should have the opposite 
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relationship. Age: We control for the age of a subject using a continuous variable indicating 
exact age and we expect older individuals to be more set in their ways and therefore age 
should be negatively associated with all types of swing voting. Information: It seems 
plausible that more knowledgeable and informed subjects would be more evaluative in 
orientation in particular in terms of public policy and collective goods. We measure a 
subject’s  access to information based on a series of questions of how often the subject gets 
information on politics from the radio, newspapers, and TV. Gender: We also include a 
control for gender where men are coded (1) and women are assigned (0). Based on the 
literature on clientelism, men should be involved in clientelism more often than women and 
therefore being male should be positively associated with clientelistic swing voting.20 
 
Research Design 
We take advantage of a unique dataset collected by one of the authors in August 200821, 
almost four months before Ghana’s concurrent presidential and legislative elections on 
December 7. The timing of the data collection was strategic. At this point, the primary 
elections for both legislative seats and presidential slots had been finalized and the revision of 
the voters’ registry just completed, but the campaigning had not started yet. Thus, potential 
voters had been registered and the candidates that would be running in each legislative 
district had been identified so as to make it possible for us to interview respondents in a 
meaningful way. At the same time, very little in terms of campaigning had taken place and 
we therefore were able to minimize the impact of the campaign on our results. As campaigns 
                                                 
20 It may be worth noting that Ghanaian folklore wisdom has it that women are more principled and less 
swayable by personal interest than men. If this is true one would expect being male to be positively associated 
with any kind of swing voting. 
21 The authors wishes to acknowledge the collaboration with CDD-Ghana for the data collection exercise, and in 
particular Victor Brobbey, Harrison Belley, Daniel Lartey, and Kojo Asante. Special thanks also to all of the 49 
very dedicated field research assistants. 
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roll out, more and voters are typically persuaded and therefore would be less likely to answer 
that something could change their mind and make them vote for a different candidate. It is to 
be expected that the longer campaigns have been running, the fewer persuadable voters will 
be left. A survey collecting data closer to polling day, hence, would run a serious risk of 
underestimating the true number of persuadable voters. It would also bias the estimates given 
that the more easily convinced voters may have different reasons for voting one way or the 
other from those who stay undecided until the very end. The chosen period for the 
intervention should generate the most reliable results. 
The survey included 1600 subjects who were recruited through clustered, stratified, 
multi-stage area probability sampling procedure.22 We include one constituency from each of 
the ten regions in Ghana reflecting a wide range of districts from safe havens to hotly 
contested constituencies, with 160 subjects interviewed in each constituency23.  
                                                 
22 This is following a procedure established by Lindberg and Morrison (2005, 2008). The strategic selection of 
constituencies was done in order to get enough respondents from each constituency in order to make valid 
inferences possible about particular areas. With respect to demographic factors and regional distribution, the 
data collected in our survey roughly matches national averages. The sampling procedure involved first 
stratifying constituencies in the 2008 elections by Ghana's ten regions. Then one constituency was strategically 
selected from each of the ten regions by weighting a number of both quantitative and qualitative indicators in 
order to ensure a representative selection of constituencies as far as possible. Within each constituency, we used 
polling stations as sampling frame, and 16 of them were selected at random by a computer guided by a distance-
rule in order to ensure geographic coverage of the constituency. Within enumeration areas, surveyors selected 
random walking paths from the designated starting points, surveyed every nth household determined by the day 
of the month and within the household, selected respondent randomly from members in the household above the 
age of 18 (c.f. Afrobarometer Survey Methods 2009). 
23 Three constituencies are safe-havens for the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and Volta region for the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC). Ho West in the Volta Region, a stronghold of the NDC, was split in two for the 
2004 election so in the second round, both these constituencies were sampled to ensure consistency over time. 
Kwabre, in the heartland of the Ashanti region is a National Patriotic Party (NPP) stronghold. Akim Swedru in 
the Eastern region was added to reflect the fact that the NPP have almost double the number of safe havens 
compared to the NDC. Besides being safe havens, each of these constituencies has a diverse population of urban 
and rural residents engaged in trading, farming and education (c.f. Lindberg and Morrison 2005). Three highly 
competitive districts were also selected. The Central region and the Greater Accra region have been contested 
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While many of the questions included in the survey employed force response formats, 
several of the questions were open-ended and gave subjects ample opportunities explain their 
answers. This served the purpose of building rapport with the survey administrator to 
enhance response quality and to increase the sheer volume of information produced by the 
survey (c.f. Groves et. Al 2004). We also wanted to make sure to capture the full range of 
responses to questions such as those addressing why a individual decided to vote for a 
different party in the last election, or chose to split his or her vote between two parties’ 
candidates in the presidential and legislative elections respectively. These answers were then 
post-coded informed by the theories of clientelism and collective/public goods discussed 
above. In this way, we sought to generate the truest possible representation of people’s actual 
views and thoughts that is possible to capture in quantitative format.  
 
The Dependent Variable and Choice of Count Regression Model  
Table 1 provides more detail on swing voting across the constituencies validating both our 
theoretical interest in the importance of swing voters for development and democracy, and 
                                                                                                                                                       
regions in several elections. Both Cape Coast and Ablekumah South constituency had been held NPP 
constituency over the last three election cycles but with radically decreasing margins and both were eventually 
lost to the NDC in 2008. Both have a combination of fishing, farming, trading, and small-scale cottage industry 
communities, and a mixture of urban and rural communities. Ablekumah South is also one of the most populous 
constituencies in the country and provide a fairly good cross-section of residents in the capital. The last 
competitive are was Bolgatanga in the far north of the country. In addition to contributing to geographical 
representation of the country and inclusion of some minority ethnic groups from the North, it is a constituency 
where one of the small parties has won a seat in the past. During the time of the survey, the PNC was holding 
the seat although it was lost to the NDC in the 2008 election. In addition four semi-competitive constituencies 
were selected. Kpone-Katamanso lies on the outskirts of the Accra/Tema metropolitan area with a mixed 
population of various occupations ranging from farmers to traders and citizens who work in the city but live 
outside. Evalue-Gwira is located in the Western region and a traditional strong-hold of the CPP, which is the 
party with the strongest historical link to the country’s founding father Kwame Nkrumah, but has become 
increasingly competitive over the years. Jaman South is located in Brong-Afaho region and while somewhat 
competitive, is still relatively safe for the NPP. Tamale Central constituency in the Northern region is also 
relatively competitive but won by the NDC.  
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our conceptualization and measurement of the phenomenon. The first column with 
percentages provides the projected vote based on what the respondents told us in the survey. 
The second column reports what share of these would consider switching their vote based on 
public policy and collective goods, as opposed to the questions that tapped into clientelistic 
provision. The third column with percentages reports the actual results in that constituency in 
the legislative elections December 7, 2009, while the final column gives the percentage gap 
between projected and actual results for each party in each constituency. Essentially, the big 
take-home lesson is that competitive constituencies have large number of potential swing 
voters a few months before the election. Hence, appealing to and convincing swing voters 
was a crucial task for political parties and the theoretical argument that swing voters not only 
decide elections but also determine whether elections work as instruments of democracy or 
not, is real in emerging democracies like Ghana. 
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
Table 1 also provides a preliminary assessment of the accuracy of our empirical data 
collection strategy measures of swing voting.  While we would not at all expect a measure of 
predisposition to vote for a candidate to one to one correspond with swing voting outcomes, 
we do see that there is enough correspondence.  For example, in Ablekuma South, roughly 
60% of the respondents in our projected their MP vote would be for the NPP but some 10 to 
20% of these voters had some potential to swing their vote by our clientelism and policy 
measures. When considering that the NPP candidate lost the 2008 elections with 46.5% of the 
votes, this gap of 13% (the last column) fits in well with the variability of the vote projections 
and thus would suggest our measure of swing voting accurately reflects swing voting 
dynamics at the constituency level. 
Our three measures of predisposition to switch the vote are non-linear count measures 
suggesting that we should use some type of the generalized linear model (McCullagh and 
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Nelder 1989). Count regression models are specific cases of GLM based on maximum 
likelihood procedures implementing conversions to make the non-linear count dependent 
variable linear (Elhai, et al. 2008, 131). These models have been used more extensively in for 
example epidemiology, public health, and biology (e.g. Agrawal et al. 2002, Brown et al. 
2005, Minami et al. 2006, Yau, et al. 2001) but to the best of our knowledge, we are the first 
to demonstrate the value of this analytical approach in studies of voting behavior, and one of 
the few ever in the discipline of political science. Hence, we will expand some on the choice 
of models and procedures. 
The simplest count model is the Poisson regression model (PRM) which assumes a 
Poisson distribution (substantial positive skew and variance that equals the mean). However, 
PRM assumes that the variable’s variance is not greater than its mean, which is rarely the 
case leading to over-dispersion (Elhai, et al. 2008, Long 1997, 219). To deal with this issue, 
the negative binominal (NB) model has been introduced which in addition to being able to 
deal with non-normal, heteroscedastic distributions includes a dispersion parameter to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity in the model and/or temporal dependency (Cameron&Trivedi 
1998, Long 1997, 236, Rose et al. 2006, 464). Yet, neither of these basic models address he 
existence of count data with excess zero values. Hurdle and zero-inflated models have been 
developed to handle covariates to a large number of zeros. The hurdle regression model is 
preferred when excess zeros are mainly due to sampling zeros whereas the zero-inflated 
models are designed to handle both sampling and structural excess zeros (Long&Freese 2006, 
387, 394). Sampling zeros are cases who happen to take on a zero-value due to the time or 
framing of the sampling, whereas structural zeros are cases that would always score zero no 
matter the parameters of the sampling. For studies of voting behavior in political science, it 
seems reasonable to assume that there are, for example, voters who would never even 
consider to vote for any other party than X (thus would be structural zeros in a sample such 
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as ours measuring swing voting). In studies of turnout, there are certainly always voters who 
would never or always go to cast their vote, and so on. In short, zero-inflated (and the related 
zero-truncated) models seems more appropriate (c.f. Atkins 2007, Cameron&Trivedi 1998, 
Long 1997). Zero-inflated regression has been used for almost two decades since the 
introduction of the zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model in econometrics by Lambert (1992) 
followed by the zero-inflated negative binominal (ZINB) regression. Following the 
conceptual logic between structural zeros (the “Always Zero”-group) and sampling zeros and 
counts (the “Not Always Zero”-group) zero-inflated models changes the mean structure to 
allow for excess zero-counts to be the result of two distinct processes rather than by one as in 
the Hurdle regression. In terms of interpretation, both ZIP and ZINB thus distinguishes 
between covariates associated with structural zeros (“Core Voters” in our study) and 
covariates associated with cases that could have a count although it is not certain given the 
sampling (“Swing/Undecided Voters” in our study)24. 
 <FGIURE  1 ABOUT HERE> 
The distribution of counts on the dependent variables in this study are illustrated in 
Figure 1. This optical suggests over-dispersion and excess of zeros in the data and using the 
command countfit in STATA, we tested PRM, NB, ZIP, and ZINB for goodness of fit. 
Observed versus predicted counts, likelihood ration chi-square statistics, Akaike’s 
information criteria, Bayenesian information criterion, and the Voung test were also used to 
determine which model is best suited to analyze our data (see Appendix A). For all three 
measures, these tests makes it clear that zero-inflated models are strongly preferred to PRM 
and NB regressions. This was expected but also makes most conceptual and theoretical sense. 
For the total swing-, and the policy swing-measures all tests indicate that ZINB is strongly 
preferred over ZIP, whereas for the clientelism swing voting measure there is somewhat of a 
                                                 
24 INSERT SHORT FORMAL DISCUSSION OF MODELS WITH EQUATIONS HERE. 
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preference for ZIP over ZINB. However, the differences in for example, observed versus 
predicted counts between ZIP and ZINB regarding the clientelism swing-measure are 
extremely small and the substantive implications of choosing one over the other are 
negligible. 
 <FGIURE  2 ABOUT HERE> 
The graphic illustration of the goodness of fit between the different models over the 
three dependent variables is displayed in Figure 2 where the reference line at zero on the y-
axis denotes the actual distribution of counts and markers indicate how much the different 
models over/under-predict the count at different values on the x-axis. The axes of the three 
graphs have been standardized to put the relative differences in the right perspective and 
illustrate the small differences in goodness of fit across the models for the clientelism 
measure compared to the other two. In the end, the value of using the same model to estimate 
all three dependent variables, thus making the results directly and unambiguously 
comparable, to our mind clearly outweighs the slight improvement in fit regarding the 
clientelism swing measure. 
 
Results  
For all the main estimations of the three dependent variables (tsv = “total swing voting”, psv 
= “policy swing voting”, and csv = “clientelism swing voting”), we report the coefficients, 
robust standard errors, z and p-values, as well as the 95% confidence interval for coefficients 
but put these in Appendix B1-B3 since the results need further analysis to be interpretable. 
When interpreting the results of zero-inflated negative binominal regression models, it is easy 
to be confused by the direction of the coefficients and Long&Freese (2006, 398) recommend 
turning to factor and/or percentage change in expected counts and odds ratio for the two 
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equations in the model respectively. Table 2A and 2B report these statistics for all three 
dependent variables along with the raw coefficients and p-values. 
<TABLE 2A and 2B ABOUT HERE > 
Table 2A contains the results from the first equation (for the “Not Always Zero” group) for 
which the factor and percentage change pertains to changes in expected counts of swing 
voting characteristics. Table 2B presents the results from the second equation which produces 
factor and percentage change in odds of being in the “Always Zero” group (core voters) 
rather than in the “Not Always Zero” group. From now on we will refer to these two groups 
as swing  and core voters respectively. 
 
Explaining Swing Voting in General   
Starting with the count-equation of swing characteristics for the overall tsv-measure, a 
number of variables are statistically insignificant: Safe Havens (H1), belonging to the ewe-
tribe (H2), the MPs performance as patron  in terms of providing personal assistance (H4) and 
MPs’ performance as law-maker (H5), an individual’s relative poverty(H6). But many 
variables have affects on the expected count of swing characteristics that are statistically 
significant. Corroborating the second hypothesis, being Ashanti increases the expected count 
by a factor of 1.26 (or by 26%) and each level towards a more intensive exposure to 
clientelism increases the expected count by a factor of 1.06 (6%), evidence in support of 
hypothesis three. Each unit increase in evaluation of MPs community development efforts 
decreases the expected count by a factor of .90 (or by -10%), while ach unit increase in 
evaluation of MPs efforts at executive oversight decreases the expected count by a factor of 
.98 (-2%), both addressing the fourth and fifth hypothesis. Looking at the control variables, 
each increase in level of education decreases the expected count by a factor of.92 (-8%), with 
each additional year of age the expected count decreases with 1%, each increase in access to 
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news also decreases the expected count by a factor of .99 (-1%), and being male increases the 
expected count by 11%. 
Moving to the second equation modeling the binary distinction between core and 
swing voters, a number of variables are also found to be statistically insignificant. Some are 
the same as for the first equation but not all: Being Ewe (H2), exposure to a greater supply of 
clientelistic offers (H3), evaluation of the MPs performance as patron providing personal 
assistance (H4), and finally an individual’s relative poverty (H6).  Among the controls, age 
and gender are unrelated to the distinction between core and swing voters. But several of the 
hypothesized factors show very strong association with the odds of being a core voter. 
Corroborating the first and second hypotheses, being an individual in a safe constituency 
increases the odds of being a core voter by a factor of 1.84 ( or by 84%) and being Ashanti 
increases the odds by factor of 1.919 (92%). Independently of those effects, each unit 
increase towards a more positive evaluation of MPs community development efforts 
increases the odds of being a core voter slightly (by factor of 1.069  or 7%), while evaluation 
of MPs lawmaking effort increases the odds of being a core voter by factor of 1.30 (31%) and 
an increase in evaluation of MPs executive oversight increases the odds by factor of 1.12. 
These three indicators all speak in support of the fifth hypothesis. Among the control 
variables, each unit increase in individual’s retrospective evaluation of his/her economic 
condition increases the odds of being a core voter by a factor of 1.08. A much greater 
substantive effect results from each unit increase in education level which decreases the odds 
of being a core voter by a factor of .67 (-33%), and from each increase in access to news 
which increases the odds of being a core voter by factor of 1.22. 
In sum, the analysis using the first dependent variable (tsv), which counts all 
characteristics predispositioning an individual to switch party, paints a relatively clear 
picture. An individual is much more likely to be a core voter if he/she resides in a safe haven, 
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belongs to the politicized tribe associated with one of the major parties, have a positive 
evaluation of the MP’s performance in terms of providing collective and public goods, 
perceives that his/her own economic situation has improved, has a low level of education, 
and has better access to information. On the other hand, among those who are not core voters, 
the predisposition to swing increases an individual is exposed to supply of clientelistic offers, 
the more he/she disapproves of the MP’s performance in providing constituency service and 
conducts executive oversight, lacks education, is younger, and is a man. 
To illustrate the substantive effects of these variables taking both equations into 
account, we created Figure 3 displaying the expected changes in the probability of being a 
core voter (hence, the reverse of the probability of being a swing voter) as independent 
variables  take on different values.25  
<FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
The effect of safe havens and competitive constituencies is captured by the solid and 
dashed lines on the first page of Figure 3, except in the lower-right graph. In the upper-right 
graph it is particularly striking how insignificant the effect of politicians’ efforts at 
clientelistic vote-buying is compared to the effect of what they do with regards to 
constituency development, law-making and even executive oversight. In light of the rather 
extensive literature on African politics claiming primacy to clientelism and ‘big man’ politics 
as the main way to get and keep power, these results are both surprising and positive. Voters 
in new democracies such as Ghana are obviously much wiser than academic observers have 
hereto given them credit for. The insignificant substantial effect of exposure to greater 
clientelistic supply shown in the upper-right graph further testifies to this. On the other hand, 
factors that in democracies the world over are found to be important to voting behavior, have 
substantively very strong effects: relative standard of living, access to information, and level 
                                                 
25 All these graphs in Figure 3, 4, and 5 were created by generating predicted probabilities . 
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of education. Poor, uninformed, and uneducated voters are much more likely to be 
persuadable (swing) voters. The left hand graph on the second page of Figure 3, looks at the 
combined effects of some of these factors: safe havens, education, and MPs’ performance. 
Performing well or bad as a ‘big man’ patron providing personal assistance to constituents 
still have no substantial impact on the probability of being a core voter, whereas the effects of 
constituency service, law-making and executive oversight remains and is relatively constant 
across the two ‘ideal type’ constructions here: an individual with no education in a safe haven 
vs. an individual with university education in a competitive constituency.  
 
Comparing Voters Persuadable by Policy and Collective Goods vs. Clientelism 
The second and third main columns of Table 2A and 2B shows the results of the zero-inflated 
negative binominal regression using the dependent variables restricted to characteristics that 
are related to programmatic policy and provision of collective goods (psv), and clientelism 
(csv) respectively. For several variables the results are essentially identical but on a few, the 
results merits noting the differences especially as these differences give us further leverage 
on some of the hypotheses discussed above.  
As above, we start with discussing the first equation modeling the expected count. 
Tribal affiliation with one of the major politicized group increases the expected count on 
policy and collective goods-swing characteristics but not clientelistic ones. The effects are 
not dramatic (being Ashanti or Ewe increases the expected count of policy swing 
characteristics by 22% and 19% respectively) but it is remarkable that tribe is not impacting 
on clientelistic swing voting given that so much of the literature assumes that clientelistic 
goods typically are channeled through informal networks structured by affiliations such as 
kinship and tribe. 
 34
Greater supply of clientelism increases the expected count of both policy and 
clientelism swing characteristics, but very modestly so (by 5% and 2% respectively). A more 
positive view of the MP as patron surprisingly affects policy-swingness but not clientelism-
swingness but the substantive effect is again negligible. More worth noting, MPs’ 
performance in terms of constituency development has both a statistically significant and 
substantively meaningful effect (-11% per unit increase in evaluation) for policy/collective 
goods-swingness, but none on clientelistic swing-voting. MPs’ performance when it comes to 
law-making and executive oversight are not statistically different from zero. Intriguingly, 
relative poverty that was insignificant for the general swing-measure is also insignificant for 
policy/collective goods-swingness but has a substantively modest (-3%) effect on the count 
of clientelistic swing-characteristics. More affluent people are indeed less likely to be 
persuadable to switch party by clientelistic factors.  
Among the control factors pocket voting and education makes no difference, whereas 
age shows an interesting pattern. When it comes to policy/collective goods-swing 
characteristics, younger people have more of them just as we would expect. When it comes to 
clientelistic swing characteristics, however, it is rather older people who have a higher 
expected count suggesting that the younger generation is more disapproving of vote-buying 
related approaches, and more concerned with policy-related issues. Finally, being male is 
positively related to a greater count (+21%)  policy/collective goods swing factors, but not to 
a higher expected count of clientelism swing characteristics.  
Moving to the second equation distinguishing between core voters and voters who 
may be persuadable, an individual in a safe haven has a 91% higher odds of being a core 
voter in the policy-swing analysis but the effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero in 
the analysis of swingness on clientelistic items. Clientelistic efforts to persuade voters are 
apparently equally effective in safe and competitive constituencies whereas efforts at winning 
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over voters based on policy issues and collective goods are only likely to be effective in 
competitive areas. Speaking strongly in favor of hypothesis two, being Ashanti increases the 
odds of being a core voter on both dependent variables. The effect is almost six times greater 
(2.08 compared to 11.7) for the clientelism items of swing, however, and for the other main 
politicized group (Ewe) the relationship switches direction between the two dependent 
variables suggesting again that the existing literature that binds ethnicity and clientelism 
together is misguided. Another reminder exposure to a greater supply of clientelistic offers 
does not have much effect on either securing core voters nor on persuading swing voters, 
comes from the statistically insignificant findings in both models. MPs performance as 
patrons offering personal assistance is also irrelevant, and so is constituency service and 
executive oversight. Each unit increase in evaluation of MPs’ performance as law-makers, 
however, increases the odds of being a core voter the substantial amount of 31% in the 
analysis of policy/collective goods-swingness but a zero relationship to clientelistic swing 
voting. Affluence has a significant effect on both dependent variables and in the expected 
direction but the substantive effect is much stronger (68% as compared to 28% increase) on 
the odds of being a core voter when considering only clientelistic swing characteristics. This 
comparison brings out clear evidence corroborating hypothesis six since affluent individuals 
are much less likely to be persuadable by clientelistic items than by policy/collective goods 
issues. This is further corroborated by the results for pocket voting. An individual’s 
perception of his/her economic situation at this time of the survey compared to one year 
earlier, has no statistically significant effect on the odds of being a core voter when 
considering only policy/collective goods factors. But when considering only clientelistic 
items, this variable has a relatively substantial effect. Each unit increase on the five-point 
scale of evaluation, increases the odds ratio by a factor of 1.8. Individuals who think they are 
better off than one year earlier have a much higher odds of being a core voter when we 
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analyze clientelistic swing voting. Level of education, however, has a similar effect on both 
dependent variables. Higher levels of education substantially decreases the odds of an 
individual being a core voter. Age has no statistically significant effects whereas greater 
access to information does – but only for policy/collective goods swing voting. The 
relationship is positive which makes sense. Being more informed about politics should make 
an individual less swayable on policy issues. Finally, gender has no impact on the odds of 
being a core voter on policy issues. Men and women are equally likely to be core voters. But 
being male significantly decreases the odds (by 59%) of being a core voter in the analysis of 
clientelistic swing voting. This implies that men are much more inclined to be swayed by 
clientelistic offers than women, perhaps reflective of what is often said that small handouts, 
jobs, and other forms of personalized clientelistic goods are more likely to go to men in the 
first place.  
<FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
Figure 4 illustrates the substantial impacts of the various variables. Of particular 
interest is that as expected an individual in safe havens are much more likely than the same 
individual in a competitive constituency, to be a core voter when it comes to policy and 
collective goods. Somewhat surprisingly, this is not true when we measure swing 
characteristics associated with political clientelism. Safe havens are simply not the 
consequence of particularly intensive or successful clientelistic strategies but rather the result 
of successful creation of party identification and policy/collective goods performance. A 
typical voter in a safe haven Ghana who perceive his/her MP to be performing very well 
when it comes to law-making, has a 72% probability of being a core voter, i.e. not being 
persuadable by any means. The same individual but with a negative perception of the MP’s 
performance as law-maker only has a 53% probability to be a core voter on the 
policy/collective goods measure. Yet, for individuals who are predispositioned to swing 
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along clientelistic lines, the difference between safe havens and competitive constituencies is 
statistically insignificant and  MPs’ performance count for very little. 
A second noteworthy effect comes from the level of education. Just as we would 
expect, lack of education makes an individual much more likely to be predispositioned to 
swing on clientelistic offers. And exactly as our hypotheses predicted, the relationship runs 
the opposite direction for policy/collective goods swing voting. Uneducated voters are much 
less likely to swing for items that are related to policy and collective goods. But exposure to 
clientelistic practices and the MPs’ performance as patron providing personal assistance has 
practically no impact on any of the two dependent variable contrary to what the existing 
literature lead us to believe. Individual voters at all levels of education, poverty, and access to 
information pay attention to what their political representatives do in terms of policy and 
provision of collective goods. Constituency service, performance when it comes to law-
making and even executive oversight greatly affects the probability that an individual will be 
a core or a swing voter whether that individual is predispositioned to swing based on 
policy/collective goods items or on clientelistic grounds. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper is one of the first to systematically address the question of whether strength of 
ethnic identity, political parties’ candidates campaign strategies, poverty, or evaluation of 
clientelism versus collective/public goods, determines who becomes persuadable voters 
(swing voters) in Africa. This is somewhat surprising given the amount of references in the 
literature on merging democracies and elections in Africa where various assumptions 
regarding the motivation of voters, and in particular voting that determines the outcome of 
elections, undergird much of the analysis.  
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As every pollster and political strategist knows, the outcome of competitive democratic 
elections are determined by the persuadable, or swing voters. Therefore it is also the swing 
voters that decide whether elections function as instruments of democracy, to borrow 
Powell’s (2000) phrase, or merely become a “harvesting season” for the portion of the 
electorate who engage in political clientelism, to borrow a phrase from an unnamed MP in 
Ghana. If political clientelism is limited, elections can become contests based on 
programmatic appeals and evaluations of collective/public goods provisions that are part and 
parcel of development efforts. Therefore a focus on the swing voters in emerging 
democracies is crucial.  
Advancing a new, more comprehensive, and more theoretically fit measure of the 
inclination to be persuaded (“swingness”), and analyzing the determinants of swing voters in 
Ghana’s 2008 election, we have been able to both refute some of the current orthodoxies as 
well as evidence some of the literature’s theoretical arguments. 
It is worth noting that the control for age shows a consistent and negative relationship 
with susceptibility for swing voting. It is an important substantive finding that corroborates 
the common sense theory that younger people are less set in their ways. But it also has an 
important methodological implication. Measures of swing voting based on indicators that 
systematically excludes younger voters, such as past voting records, are likely to produce 
biased results and this finding validates our approach to measuring “swingness”. Measures of 
past voting behavior that do not include first-time voters—who are most often youth that 
reach the legal voting age—also do not include the most prevalent group of swing voters.  
Our analysis corroborates the hypothesis that swing vote-inclination vary over 
constituency competitiveness but with an important qualifier that the count model allows us 
to see. It is only associated with distinguishing core voters from those who have any 
predisposition to swing. It does not affect the composition nor the number of characteristics 
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of ‘swingness’. With regards to the second hypothesis about ethnic voting our findings lend 
more support to some research work done by (Cheeseman 2008, Lindberg&Morrison 2008) 
that have questioned the ethnic census thesis (c.f. Ferree et. Al 2009).  Still Ewe and Ashanti 
are dominant players in tribal voting and these tribes are concentrated in certain 
constituencies and are associated with being a core voter.  
Testing the third and fourth hypotheses we find little evidence to support the expected 
relationship. Greater exposure to clientelism has generally no or very limited impact on 
swingness. The supply-side of clientelism is not an important determinant of people’s 
behavior. The results suggests that the presence of clientelism in African elections may not be 
single-handedly damning for democratic accountability.  Some voters—ones that are willing 
to change their votes over substantive, policy appeals—are unaffected by often pervasive 
levels of clientelism. The fourth hypothesis that voters will reward their MPs for providing 
private goods, such as school fees, jobs, and other private transfers, also do not get much 
support from our analysis. This is the demand side of clientelism and it seems to have little 
significant impact on swing voting – even clientelistic swing characteristics. This finding 
contradicts much of we have been taken as conventional wisdom in African politics (without 
much systematic evidence perhaps) holding that citizens in Africa are easily swayed by 
whomever lures with distribution of private goods. 
The testing of the fifth hypothesis provides some further clues to the question of what 
makes politicians in a new democracy like Ghana decide on whether to pursue a clientelistic 
path or not. Voters who evaluate a particular MP positively in terms of provision of collective 
goods provided for the constituency, law-making, and to some extent executive oversight, are 
significantly less likely to consider switching their vote for any reason. The flip-side of this is 
that the greater the dissatisfaction with the MPs performance on these public and collective 
goods, the higher the inclination for an individual to switch his or her vote. This suggests that 
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voters in Ghana, especially the ones who are most likely to change their vote over political 
policy truly value the performance of an MP in terms of public and collective goods 
provisions.  Consequently, MPs must meet the demands of their constituents to deliver on 
these public goods, or voters will punish them for their poor performance.  Thus, elections in 
fact have the potential to serve as an opportunity to deepen democracy and improve 
governance in sub-Saharan Africa. These voters use elections to reward and sanction 
behavior of politicians in terms of their performance as public officials who are supposed to 
act in the public interest.26 Whether elections will be instruments of democracy, or not, is in 
part dependent on how politicians chose to behave in the longer run.27 
Finally, the literature led us to consider this in light of socio-economic status because 
voters who are poor and uneducated are expected to be more easily swayed. Our analysis 
demonstrates that individuals who perceive themselves to be poorer than the average 
Ghanaian, have a significantly higher inclination to be a swing voter on policy/collective 
goods characteristics but less likely to be swayable on clientelistic items. That same dual-
directional relationship is found with regards to education. Individuals with little or no 
education are less likely to be swayable by policy/collective goods issues but more likely to 
be persuadable by clientelistic items.  
The latter is a significant finding that points towards a possible future in emerging 
democracies in Africa such as Ghana. If incentives and support for politicians can be 
structured as to help them supply more collective goods, even if this means primarily 
                                                 
26 Our measure is not sensitive to ideology or differences in political platforms other than to distinguish 
politicians who use clientelism as a campaign strategy to a greater extent than others. 
27 Naturally, this conclusion raises the next question going further back in the causal chain: What determines the 
behavior of these politicians. While we can provide some thoughts on this as in the following, the present 
project was not designed to answer that question. Fieldwork in Ghana suggests, however, that societal norms of 
reciprocity involving “parental” responsibility for the welfare of the constituents in return for support, is one 
important factor. (Lindberg forthcoming 2010) 
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constituency service to begin with, winning elections then become a matter of competing to 
provide more of, or higher quality, collective goods and not about strategic and efficient use 
of clientelism. More pervasive supply of clientelistic goods and services increases the number 
of people who are likely to consider to switch their political loyalty but only marginally. 
However, when voters perceive that politicians do a good job at providing collective goods 
for the constituency, clientelistic-private goods provision no longer matters for swing voters. 
In addition, poverty impacts on “swingness”. In short, much of the power to make sure that 
elections become instruments of democracy lies in the hands of the political elites. It is 
possible for them in African democracies such as Ghana to focus primarily on provision of 
collective goods. When they do, it pays off in terms of winning over swing voters. Then, 
swing voters decide elections and they request more collective, as opposed to private, 
clientelistic, goods. In short, voters in emerging democracies like Ghana on the one hand 
seem to display a clear pattern of “mature” democratic accountability. They evaluate 
incumbents on a range of issues that has to do primarily with constituency service, and if they 
are dissatisfied with the incumbent’s record of accomplishment, they become more likely to 
“throw the rascals out”. This should in the long run create the kind of learning mechanism 
democratic theory hopes leading to politicians behaving in ways that are more in line with the 
interests and needs of the people. Elections thus are, at least to some extent, instruments of 
democracy. 
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Table 1: Projected MP Vote vs 2008 Results, By Constituency       
Type Constituency Party 
Projected 
Vote % N 
% Policy Swing, by 
Projected Vote*** 
MP 
Election 
Results, 
2008 
Project 
/2008 
Result 
Gap 
Competitive Ablekuma S. NPP  34.4% 55 20.0% 46.5% 12.1% 
  NDC 20.0% 32 34.4% 51.2% 31.2% 
  CPP 3.1% 5 40.0% 1.2% -1.9% 
  PNC -- -- - 0.8%  
  None* 33.8% 38 12.0%   
   Total  130    
     
* chi square = 10.52, p=.061, 
df=5   
 Cape Coast NPP 24.4% 39 12.8% 44.0% 19.6% 
  NDC 40.0% 64 20.3% 54.1% 14.1% 
  CPP 6.9% 11 18.9% 1.3% -5.6% 
  PNC 1.3% 2 0.0% --  
  None* 15.6% 25 8.0%   
   Total  141 
* chi square = 4.871, p=845, 
df=9   
 Bolgatanga NPP  16.3% 26 42.3% 20.2% 3.9% 
  NDC 18.8% 30 36.7% 57.7% 38.9% 
  CPP 1.3% 2 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 
  PNC 21.3% 34 11.8% 20.1% -1.2% 
  None* 29.4% 47 32.4%   
   Total 142    
     
* chi square = 18.20, p=.011, 
df=7   
Semi-
competitive Tamale C. NPP 26.3% 42 33.3% 31.4% 5.2% 
  NDC 45.0% 72 26.4% 65.6% 20.6% 
  CPP 3.1% 5 60.0% 1.5% -1.6% 
  PNC 0.6% 1 100.0% 0.6% 0.0% 
  None* 13.7% 22 8.0%   
   Total  142 
* chi square = 14.88, p=.038, 
df=7   
 Jaman S. NPP 55.0% 88 28.4% 55.8% -0.8% 
  NDC 17.5% 28 32.1% 34.3% -16.8% 
  CPP 3.8% 6 33.3% 0.4% 3.4% 
  PNC 1.9% 3 33.3% 0.7% 1.2% 
  None* 6.3% 10 17.2%   
   Total  135 
* chi square = 5.99, p=.647, 
df=8   
 Evalue-Gwira NPP 35.6% 57 17.5% 57.6% -22.0% 
  NDC 13.8% 22 40.9% 30.8% -17.0% 
  CPP 12.5% 20 25.0% 11.5% 1.0% 
  PNC -- -- --   
  None* 21.9% 35 31.4%   
   Total  134 
* chi square = 13.1, p=.022, 
df=5   
 Kpone Kat. NPP 27.9% 44 25.0% 32.5% -4.6% 
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  NDC 31.7% 50 10.0% 63.0% -31.3% 
  CPP 7.6% 12 41.7% 4.6% 3.0% 
  PNC 1.3% 2 0.0% --  
  None* 17.8% 28 28.0%   
   Total  136    
Safe Havens Ho West    
* chi square = 17.32, p=.015, 
df=7   
  NPP 15.6% 25 32.0% 11.4% 4.2% 
  NDC 53.8% 86 24.4% 87.5% -33.7% 
  CPP 1.3% 2 50.0% 1.1% 0.2% 
  PNC -- -- -- --  
  None* 13.0% 21 25.0%   
   Total  134 * chi square = 4.63, p=.592 df=6   
 Kwabre E. NPP 71.9% 115 21.7% 76.0% -4.1% 
  NDC 6.9% 11 36.7% 19.8% -12.9% 
  CPP 1.9% 3 33.3% 3.1% -1.2% 
  PNC -- -- --   
  None* 10.6% 17 14.3%   
   Total  146    
     
* chi square = 6.84, p=.554, 
df=8   
 Akim Swedru NPP  50.6% 81 24.0% 63.6% -13.0% 
  NDC 10.6% 17 16.3% 35.7% -25.1% 
  CPP 1.3% 2 50.0% 0.7% 0.6% 
  PNC -- -- --   
  None* 7.0% 11 25.0%   
      Total  111 
* chi square = 16.98, p=.009 
df=6     
*This includes undecided and undisclosed, as well as ‘don’t know’. ***These values correspond with the percentage of 
project voters for party X who indicatea propensity to vote that is “high” to “very high”  
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Table 2A             
Count Equation: Factor Change in Expected Count for Swing Characteristics           
 tsv     psv     csv    
 b P>z e^b* %ª b P>z e^b* %ª b P>z e^b* %ª 
Safe Haven .012 .514 1.01 1 -.042 .079 0.96 -4 -.141 .146 0.9 -13 
Tribe: Ashanti .227 .000 1.26 26 .200 .000 1.22 22 .101 .662 1.1 11 
Tribe: Ewe .110 .114 1.12 12 .178 .000 1.19 19 -.068 .647 0.9 -7 
Clientelism Supply .061 .005 1.06 6 .051 .022 1.05 5 .017 .008 1.0 2 
Patron Assistance -.002 .633 1.00 0 .011 .001 1.01 1 .000 .998 1.0 0 
Constituency 
Service -.102 .001 0.90 -10 -.115 .000 0.89 -11 -.052 .193 0.9 -5 
Law-Making .083 .070 1.09 9 .082 .111 1.09 9 -.051 .187 0.9 -5 
Executive Oversight -.021 .003 0.98 -2 -.028 .388 0.97 -3 .003 .941 1.0 0 
Relative Poverty .018 .574 1.02 2 .019 .149 1.02 2 -.027 .003 1.0 -3 
Pocket Voting .039 .088 1.04 4 .065 .155 1.07 7 .058 .125 1.1 6 
Level of Education .079 .000 0.92 -8 .000 .999 1.00 0 -.066 .206 0.9 -6 
Age -.005 .002 1.00 -1 -.004 .023 1.00 0 .002 .000 1.0 0 
Access to 
Information -.005 .030 0.99 -1 -.001 .944 1.00 0 -.092 .148 0.9 -9 
Gender (Male=1) .103 .000 1.11 11 .188 .000 1.21 21 -.019 .791 1.0 -2 
               
Table 2B               
Binary Equation: Factor Change in Odds of Always 0                 
 tsv     psv     csv    
 b P>z   
  
e^b** %ªª b P>z   
  
e^b** %ªª b P>z   
  
e^b** %ªª 
Safe Haven .610 .000 1.84 84 .646 .000 1.91 91 1.168 .247 3.2 222 
Tribe: Ashanti .652 .000 1.92 92 .731 .000 2.08 108 2.455 .000 11.7 1065 
Tribe: Ewe .279 .313 1.32 32 .323 .008 1.38 38 -14.560 .006 0.0 -100 
Clientelism Supply .014 .756 1.01 1 .038 .343 1.04 4 -.232 .224 0.8 -21 
Patron Assistance -.031 .763 0.97 -3 -.013 .915 0.99 -1 -.086 .615 0.9 -8 
Constituency 
Service .068 .000 1.07 7 .065 .217 1.07 7 .698 .116 2.0 101 
Law-Making .266 .000 1.30 31 .267 .000 1.31 31 -.145 .608 0.9 -14 
Executive Oversight .114 .000 1.12 12 .055 .483 1.06 6 1.721 .156 5.6 459 
Relative Poverty .180 .156 1.20 20 .245 .000 1.28 28 .519 .000 1.7 68 
Pocket Voting .075 .000 1.08 8 .055 .300 1.06 6 .581 .000 1.8 79 
Level of Education -.402 .000 0.67 -33 -.322 .000 0.72 -28 -.887 .000 0.4 -59 
Age .001 .938 1.00 0 -.001 .930 1.00 0 .037 .424 1.0 4 
Access to 
Information .200 .020 1.22 22 .179 .017 1.20 20 .124 .320 1.1 13 
Gender (Male=1) -.103 .340 0.90 -10 .033 .815 1.03 3 -.886 .000 0.4 -59 
*e^b = exp(b) = factor change in expected count for unit increase in X        
**e^b = exp(b) = factor change in odds for unit increase in X         
ªpercent change in expected count for unit increase in X          
ªª percent change in odds for unit increase in 
X           
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Fig. 2 
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FIGURE 3 – COMBINATION OF GRAPHS ON TSV (FIRST DV, GENERAL SWING) 
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FIG. 3 CONTINUED… 
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FIGURE 4 – COMPARISON BETWEEN PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF BEING CORE VOTER – PSV and 
CS  
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Appendix B1:  ZINB - TOTAL SWING VOTING MEASURE 
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 Appendix B2:  ZINB - POLICY SWING VOTING MEASURE 
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Appendix B3: ZINB - CLIENTELISM SWING VOTING MEASURE 
 
